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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
It is better that Tomislav Nikolić, Aleksandar Vučić, Ivica Dačić, 
Aleksandar Vulin should be humiliated rather than the people they 
lead. When one attends the same rostrum with the man who 
represents a country which we do not recognize to exist and the man 
under investigation in connection with the yellow house and human 
organ trafficking – and right now we demand from the Security 
Council to speed up that investigation and finally obtain some results - 
we attend the same rostrum as he – and yes, that’s a humiliation. But 
it is better that this humiliation be suffered by Tomislav Nikolić and 
Vučić and Dačić and Vulin, and all the Vulins of this world, than by the 
people they represent at this historical moment. So yes, yes it is, it is.   
 
Aleksandar Vulin, the director of the Government of Serbia Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija, March 24, 2013 
 
 
  
Ivica Dačid, Prime Minister of Serbia 
March 2006 
Aleksandar Vučid,  Deputy Prime Minister 
of Serbia 
May 2007 
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The Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS) from Belgrade hopes 
that Belgrade and Prishtina will reach an agreement on long-term 
sustainable solution to their relations, which will accelerate the 
process of normalization of mutual relations and European 
integration of both parties. The beginning of Serbia’s negotiations 
with the EU with the opening of particular Chapters is particularly 
important in terms of improving the situation in the security sector, 
given that Chapters 23 and 24, which are assumed to be opened 
early in the negotiation process, broadly speaking concern the 
security sector. CEAS recommends that in the case of Serbia, Chapter 
31 – Foreign Security and Defense Policy and parts of Chapter 34 – 
Political Criteria – should be opened as soon as possible, precisely in 
order to timely raise all the issues regarding obligations in terms of 
reform of the security sector expected by the European Commission 
(EC) and other EU bodies.  
Catch 22 is that CEAS is convinced that failures in the security 
system, both institutional and personal, are among the main 
obstacles for establishment of a comprehensive and sustainable 
solution to relations between Belgrade and Prishtina.   
Except some important organizational measures, such as the 
removal of civilian intelligence service from the area of jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Interior (MUP) by setting up the Security 
Information Agency (BIA) with all the deficiencies of the law 
regulating its work, the removal of the Military Security Service 
(VBA) and the Military Intelligence Service (VOA) from the area of 
jurisdiction of the General Staff of the Army of Serbia and their 
placement under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense or the 
passing of the Law which regulates their work in greater detail, the 
professionalization of the Army and new Standing Orders of the 
National Parliament of Republic of Serbia which somewhat 
strengthened the work of two recently established parliamentary 
committees for defense, security and the oversight over the 
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intelligence services, the security system in Serbia has not been 
reformed, either normatively or personally.  
There are still constitutional incompatibilities, which are conducive 
to abuses, as well as inept legal solutions which result in areas of 
jurisdiction defined too broadly and/or their overlapping. The 
absence of political will is obvious to fully apply the existing 
legislation and Constitutional mechanisms of democratic control 
over the security system, let alone to harmonize and advance these 
in accordance with practices in stable democratic societies. 
There is still inexcusably large number of persons who have been 
deeply compromised during the conflicts in the 1990s, especially 
during the conflict in Kosovo in 1998/1999, working in the security 
system in Serbia, occupying both leadership and other positions. 
There are a large number of violent deaths of soldiers and civilians 
for which the Army of Serbia is accused and which for years remain 
insufficiently investigated1. The system2 is increasingly hit by affairs 
for which there are many indications that they are settlements 
between the various parts of the system itself. These, increasingly, 
erupt precisely at the moment when Serbia steps towards 
normalization of its relations with Kosovo. 
The aim of this report is to point out to possible, primarily security 
and political obstacles to implementation of the agreement that will 
possibly be reached between Belgrade and Prishtina, especially in 
case the agreement is reached a result of pressure and the desire to 
score a result rather than as a result of well-thought-out strategy 
containing an elaborate implementation and oversight plan.  
                                                             
1 Peacefare, CEAS report (2009) Political, Media-Related and Legal Analysis of the Case of RTS, Topčider and 
Leskovac 
http://www.peacefare.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/CEAS-Report-Politcal-Media-Related-and-Legal-Analysis-
of-the-Five-Cases1.pdf 
2 For the purposes of this report, CEAS considers the security system of the Republic of Serbia to encompass the 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and the security-intelligence agencies 
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We maintain that the same causes may lead to Serbia, in case and 
agreement is not reached relatively fast, losing its present, at least 
formal and/or exhorted commitment to a continued joint search for 
long-term and sustainable solution of relations with Kosovo, under 
the auspices of the European Union, guaranteeing European 
perspective for both Serbia and Kosovo. This would have 
ambiguously bad consequences for Serbia.  
The report will also list some decisions and tendencies of the 
Western international community which contribute to confusion of 
the Serbian public and, in CEAS opinion, do not contribute to the 
creation of a sustainable agreement. Here we primarily refer to the 
quite unfounded belief that the current Government is strongly 
committed to Serbia’s efforts to reach an agreement, and that it 
therefore enjoys the institutional and political strength to 
implement the eventual agreement on the ground, especially in the 
north of Kosovo.  
Figuratively speaking, the competition for the X Factor – Serbia, is 
not over yet. The strength, desire and “that something special – the X 
Factor” to lead Serbia, for one reason or another, towards the 
political East or the political West have differently grouped, and not 
necessarily mutually ideologically linked fractions in the Serbian 
society and state institutions. 
CEAS considers as counterproductive the high willingness of the 
Western international community to forget or forgive the 
relationship which the current ruling set in power in Serbia had 
with the recent war crimes nature of the Milošević regime and their 
role in the past; although nothing substantial, even in the fight 
against corruption, has been achieved yet,. This greatly complicates 
the already weak process of implementing transitional justice in 
Serbia and the rest of the Western Balkans, as well as its long term 
sustainable stabilization and democratization.  
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CEAS reiterates that consistent implementation of transitional 
justice, and primarily war crimes trials before national courts and 
The Hague Tribunal, is exactly the best and sometimes the only 
mechanism for creating the essential conditions for reforms of the 
security system. It is exactly this system, unreformed and 
criminalized, which is often the main obstacle to stabilization and 
democratization in post-conflict countries.  
Among else, CEAS recommends that the Western international 
community involves itself more intensively in the support and 
implementation of continued security system reform in Serbia, 
which would contribute to the enhancement of opportunities for 
achieving and implementing sustainable normalization with Kosovo. 
CEAS suggests slightly less opportunism in the Western 
international community’s approach as well, in their evaluation of 
events in Serbia today. The current dose of opportunism, along with 
the sketchy arguments why Kosovo must become independent from 
Serbia, introduces additional confusion into Serbian society, hard hit 
by the economic crisis and transition.  
CEAS highlights, as extremely important, that already now would be 
a good time to pay attention to the existence of parasecurity   units 
of the Serbian Government in Kosovo (Emergency Response units), 
which have a command structure, logistics, goals and else. If these 
are not covered by the talks, with all doubts about them removed in 
time, there is a serious threat of one party saying “that means they 
must be transformed” and the other “that means that during 
negotiations no one had any objections and therefore they stay”, at a 
later date. 
CEAS calls upon the Western international community to try to do 
everything from their side in order not to slow down the process of 
Serbian European integration, including supporting the Kosovo side 
to make certain legislative changes in order to achieve sustainable 
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solutions, because Serbia does not have the inner strength to 
complete the process of democratic consolidation on its own.  
Slowing down this process would lead to an additional decline in 
public support for European integration in Serbia and strengthening 
of anti-Western undemocratic options in Serbia. It should not be 
forgotten that, one way or another, generations of Serbian citizens, 
members of civil society and political parties worked hard, often in 
very dangerous conditions, for Serbia’s formal European path and 
its integration, and therefore confrontation with the recent past and 
erection of transitional justice in the past twenty years. One gets the 
impression that in case of absence of an agreement, or its 
dysfunction in practice, due to the intention of the Western 
international community to put an end to the question of Kosovo’s 
status, in the absence of an adequate „Plan B“, exactly these groups 
will be the biggest losers. In this case, it is very likely that the 
winners of the X Factor Serbia competition will be performers who 
will carry out the Putinization of Serbia.   
 
SHORT REVIEW OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE SECURITY 
SYSTEM IN SERBIA SINCE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL AND 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
Despite the obvious fact that it is desperately needed to reform the 
security sector, the continuation of reform of the security sector has 
practically not been mentioned even once by political participants in 
the election campaign for 2012 presidential and parliamentary 
elections, while media have not considered this topic the one they 
should question their guests, the participants of the election 
campaign, about. The results of elections have brought changes to 
the distribution of political power. Tomislav Nikolić, the president of 
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the Serbian Progress Party, beat at the presidential elections the 
previous President of Serbia and the Democratic Party, Boris Tadić. 
The new ruling majority in the Serbian Parliament was formed by 
the Serbian Progress Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the United 
Regions of Serbia and some other smaller parties. The parties 
presently forming the parliamentary majority have not mentioned 
reform of the security sector as one of the priorities either during 
the election campaigns or as one of the priorities of the work of the 
new Serbian Government.  
After the parliamentary majority was formed in the Parliament of 
Serbia, a series of very problematic laws and decisions regarding the 
security sector have been enacted, which contract the democratic 
practice and degrade the previously attained standards of 
democratic control over the security sector. The amendments to the 
Law on the Basic Structure of Republic of Serbia Security Services 
have been made without broader expert or professional discussion. 
The draft law envisages that the Secretary of the National Security 
Council should from now on be appointed by the President of Serbia, 
rather than that the post should automatically be occupied by the 
President’s Chief of Cabinet, as had previously been the case, 
whereby the powers of the President of Serbia have been increased, 
although they should exclusively be regulated by the Constitution of 
Serbia. The Defense Minister Aleksandar Vučić has been appointed 
Coordinator of the Work of All Intelligence Services, whereby the 
autonomy of the work of the civilian intelligence agency BIA was 
degraded. Experts whom CEAS contacted also point out to the fact 
that Aleksandar Vučić, the Defense Minister, greatly expanded the 
limits of what is commonly considered as “coordination of the 
security services” which primarily refers to the processing of 
current cases so that these do not overlap and therefore in order for 
information on them to be adequately exchanged.  
A good democratic practice which existed in Serbia that the 
president of the parliamentary committee for the oversight over the 
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security services should come from the ranks of the opposition has 
been abandoned and presidents of both parliamentary committees 
in charge of defense, security and the oversight over the intelligence 
and security services now come from the ranks of the newly formed 
parliamentary majority.  
The leaderships of the Security Information Agency BIA and the 
National Bank of Serbia were dismissed from their posts almost 
simultaneously. Even though terms in office of the Director of BIA as 
well as the Governor of the Serbian National Bank last five years 
rather than four, a year longer than the Government’s term in office, 
precisely in order to safeguard independence of the work of these 
two institutions, the new Government has continued the negative 
tendency began by former President of Serbia who “shortened his 
term in office” having resigned a year before his term in office was 
due to end. The post of the Governor of the National Bank of Serbia 
is occupied by a senior official of the Serbian Progress Party, 
Jorgovanka Tabaković, who “froze” her position and membership in 
the Serbian Progress Party. The post of the Director of the Security 
Information Agency BIA, without any explanation why the previous 
director Saša Vukadinović, during whose term in office Hague 
fugitives from justice Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić were 
arrested, should be replaced, is now occupied by Nebojša Rodić, a 
person compromised by participation in the electoral fraud in 1996.  
The official lack of interest and silence which existed in the pre-
election period and the speed with which legislative amendments 
regarding the security sector were made after the new 
parliamentary majority was formed, clearly confirm that reform 
itself is not the aim, but rather an intention to assume control over 
the sector and overturn the previous achievements by removing 
them from the purview of competent institutions, placing the 
security sector more tightly under the political party oversight and 
patronage.  
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The new authorities in Serbia, even though they have displayed an 
obvious readiness and strength to dismiss people in the security 
sector who are not to their liking, have not made a single personnel 
change among the top ranks of the General Staff or among the 
leadership of the Military Security Agency, even though they are 
occupied by people with deeply compromised professional careers. 
Moreover, the Chief of the General Staff, Ljubiša Diković, during 
whose term in office in Kosovo many war crimes in the zone of his 
command responsibility 3  were allegedly committed, has been 
promoted, as well as his closest associates.4 
The European Union officials have expressed a concern that 
amendments to the Law on the National Bank of Serbia would limit 
independence of the central bank, emphasizing in particular that 
Serbia is a candidate for membership in the European Union, as well 
as that independence of institutions is one of the basic principles in 
the EU; however, they have not publicly commented inapt legislative 
and political decisions by the new authorities regarding the security 
system. This tendency of tacit ignoring by EU officials of increasingly 
large problems in the security sector continued even when it 
became clear that some parts of the Ministry of Interior there exist 
fractions which operate outside the formal chain of command, on 
top of which is the Minister of Interior and Serbian Prime Minister, 
Ivica Dačić. CEAS sources believe that there are people working in 
the Ministry of Interior who do not respect the formal chain of 
subordination and who, most likely, operate based on orders from 
BIA and/or and the Cabinet of the Defense Minister, Aleksandar 
Vučić, which is why the Government of Serbia, among other, has for 
                                                             
3 Humanitarian Law Fund (2012) The Dossier of Dikovid Ljubiša 
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Januar-23-2012-Dikovic-Ljubisa-Dosije.pdf  
4 B92, 13.2.2013. Nikolid promoted Dikovid 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=02&dd=13&nav_category=11&nav_id=686626  
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months not been able to appoint the new general director (general 
operative) of the police5.  
Great party wrangling over actual control over the police was 
evident in the Ministry of the Interior during the former 
Government’s mandate as well, which led to a situation in which the 
recently re-elected Police Director Milorad Veljović, was then Acting 
Police Director as there was no consensus over his re-election or 
dismissal. The same party wrangling instead of institutional 
strengthening of the police resulted with Niš and Novi Sad, both 
large Serbian cities, not having a Chief of Police for three years. Niš 
had its Chief of Police named only in March 2013. Crime levels in 
both cities increased during this period. There are serious 
indications that in Niš and Vranje, increased numbers of unresolved 
serious incidents directly involve members of the police as well.  
In late 2012 the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić and the First 
Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić launched an 
enormous affair of alleged unauthorized monitoring of listings of 
their telephone conversations by the Criminal Police 6 . They 
themselves later ended the affair entirely, even though it never had 
a clear epilogue. It remains unclear whether it was in fact the 
criminal police, and who was it exactly, that acted unlawfully, and if 
so, whether someone was punished for it, or whether the affair was 
eventually halted because it eventually traced illegal activities of the 
two of them. 
The Law on the Basic Structure of Republic of Serbia Military 
Security Services was again amended in winter 2013 after a series of 
political scandals which culminated in disclosure of the fact that the 
police crime investigation unit has been tracking electronic 
                                                             
5
 Despite the fact that Vučid. Although the Defence Minister, coordinates teams for the fight against corruption, 
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Interior 
6 CEAS (November 2012) Foreword by Jelena Milid, CEAS Director, for The New Century quarterly „In a snake’s 
nest“ 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/tromesecnik/New-Century-No-2-Jelena-Milic.pdf  
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communications of the President of Serbia and the Defense Minister 
as a result of huge normative omissions in the security sector and 
political abuse of those omissions, primarily in terms of the right to 
track and the manner of tracking electronic communication, 
regarding which the Constitutional Court has declared certain 
provisions of the Criminal Code unconstitutional. The Commissioner 
for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection 
and the Ombudsman have been pointing to the problematic nature 
of these provisions for more than a year, submitting a request for 
the review of constitutionality of certain provisions of the Criminal 
Code.  
Despite the aforementioned, a comprehensive solution containing 
14 essential points7 that will improve the state of affairs in the field 
of the oversight over tracking electronic communications, presented 
by the Commissioner and the Ombudsman in summer 2012, has 
never been taken into serious consideration both either the ruling 
majority or the opposition.  
The international organization Transparency International, in its 
report published in January 2013, categorized Serbia as belonging to 
group D+ as a country with high risk of corruption in the security 
sector, along with countries such as Ukraine, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kenya and Mexico.8   
The state officials who supposedly lead the alleged fight against 
corruption, even amidst its comprehensive conducting, do not even 
mention corruption in the security system in Serbia.  
                                                             
7 CEAS: 14 Proposals by Šabid and Jankovid for the Law on Personal Data Protection 
http://ceas-
serbia.org/root/images/14_Recommendations_by_%C5%A0abi%C4%87_and_Jankovi%C4%87_for_the_Law_on_P
ersonal_Data_Protection.pdf  
8 Transparency International UK (2013) Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index 2013 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/images/Government_Defense_Anti-Corruption_Index.pdf  
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Professor Miroslav Hadžić, PhD, has published a paper “The 
Whirlpool of Corruption in the Security Sector,”9 drawing attention 
to the fact that high corruption in the security sector is an 
introduction into political abuse of coercive state apparatuses, as 
well as its direct consequence. According to Hadžić, “in the hallways 
of political and other corruption, especially in post-conflict and post-
authoritarian systems such as the one in Serbia, there is perennial 
danger of criminalization of politics and politicization of crime.” 
The Prime and Interior Minister of Serbia, Ivica Daćić, the chief 
negotiator in Brussels, is under investigation for suspicious 
meetings with a Rodoljub Radulović, indicted for drug smuggling, 
currently a fugitive from justice10. This scandal was revealed by… 
daily newspapers Informer11, which are considered to be directly 
controlled by the Serbian Progress Party and the Security 
Information Agency BIA. The Interior Ministry State Secretary 
Vladimir Božović, appointed to the post by the Serbian Progress 
Party, has recently said that investigation proceeded “very 
intensively regardless of the name, the surname, the post and the 
position and no-one will be protected from the investigation.”12 
During this affair, the name of Branko Lazarević, former Chief of 
Staff and closest associate of former and current Minister of Interior 
Ivica Dačić, who in 2010 switched to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), was mentioned again increasingly. Apparently, Dačić broke 
off cooperation with Lazarević because of his alleged past 
friendships with certain people who have come into conflict with the 
law, whilst Lazarević’s transition to MFA was organized in order to 
cover up for unpleasant indications 13 . The Prosecution for 
                                                             
9
 Hadžid, Miroslav (2013) The Whirlpools of Corruption in the Security Sector 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/images/Miroslav_Hadzic_Vrtlozi_korupcije.pdf  
10 Blic online, 3.3.2013. Preliminary hearing at the Special Court without Miša Banana 
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/370414/Pripremno-rociste-u-Specijalnom-sudu-bez-Mise-Banane  
11
 Channel 9, 4.2.2013. How much is Dačid involved in the Šarid Affair? 
 http://www.kanal9tv.com/2013/02/04/koliko-je-dacic-umesan-u-aferu-saric/ 
12 RTV, 27.3.2013. Božovid: Shedding Light on the Contact between Dačid and Radulovid 
http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/politika/bozovic:-rasvetljavanje-kontakata-dacica-i-radulovica_380891.html  
13 Press online, 9.11.2012. Dačid’s Office Head leaves post, dismissals in MUP?! 
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Organized Crime announced in February 2013 the initiation of a 
preliminary investigation against Branko Lazarević, as well as 
against at least five senior managers of the Serbian Ministry of 
Interior, who had contact with Rodoljub Radulović, member of the 
drug-lord Darko Šarić’s criminal group14. 
The credibility of the Interior Minister, as well as the entire Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, has been additionally challenged with possible 
investigation against members of the Gendarmerie against which 
there are allegations, coming from parts of the Interior Ministry 
itself, and again, through the daily newspapers Informer, that its 
members were involved in illegal doings, primarily in southern 
Serbia15. Intriguingly, during this affair, the online portal Pravda, 
close to parts of the SNS, published a series of articles criticizing the 
work of the police officers who accused the members of the 
Gendarmerie and defending its commander 16 . Otherwise, the 
commander of the Gendarmerie, Bratislav Dikić, already well-known 
to the broader public for his extreme authoritarianism and self-will 
voiced himself via his Facebook profile, with rather problematic 
statement, which none of the officials had courage to condemn17.  
The State Secretary at the Ministry of Interior Vladimir Božović 
stated in late March 2013 that the preliminary results of the 
investigation of abuses in the Gendarmerie can be expected soon. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 http://www.pressonline.rs/info/politika/139838/otisao-dacicev-sef-kabineta-smene-u-mup.html 
14
 RTS, 6.2.2013. Novosti: Pretrial proceedings against Lazarevid 
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1261108/Novosti%3A+Pretkrivični+postupak+protiv+Lazarevida
.html 
15
 RTS, 12.3.2013. The Dikid Case, Allegations and Denials  
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1283040/Slu%C4%8Daj+Diki%C4%87,+optu%C5%BE
be+i+demanti.html  
16 Pravda, 16.3.2013. EXCLUSIVE: Who set up the Gendarmerie Commander? 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/home-sr/93-preuzeto/934-ekskluzivno-ko-je-smestio-komandantu-
zandarmerije 
Pravda, 17.3.2013. OFFICIAL NOTES: How Dikid was declared a criminal 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/home-sr/93-preuzeto/935-sluzbene-beleske-kako-je-dikic-proglasen-
kriminalcem 
17 Blic online, 10.3.2013. The Gendarmerie Commander Wrote on Facebook  
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/371558/Komandant-Zandarmerije-se-oglasio-na-Fejsbuku  
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Shortly before the publication of this report, the Informer launched 
yet another affair in which it is claimed that the police leadership is 
requesting the dismissal of the Special Prosecutor for Organized 
Crime Miljko Radislavljević. 
There is far less information about the situation in the Defense 
Ministry, partly because Aleksandar Vučić, due to the numerous 
posts he occupies, seems to pay the least attention to his post of the 
Defense Minister. However there is a tendency of strengthening 
bilateral cooperation with Russia, in order to “restore a balance” 
that was disrupted during the previous government.18 According to 
the information available to CEAS, the Defense Ministry is in very 
unenviable financial position. Two series of promotion and 
retirement decisions regarding senior and high military officials 
indicate that there is a tendency of strengthening the position of the 
Chief of General Staff Ljubiša Diković, who was deeply compromised 
during the conflict in Kosovo, and the staff loyal to him.  
This Government has not displayed any intention to shed more light 
on the circumstances which helped Ratko Mladić and Radovan 
Karadžić successfully evade justice for so long, although there are 
many indications that they were assisted by renegade parts of the 
security system, primarily the Army of Serbia. Unfortunately, the 
Western international community practically pays no official 
attention any more to this issue.  
Serbia is still the only country in South East Europe which does not 
have an adequate legal framework regulating the private security 
sector, which is presently estimated to employ between 25,000 and 
60,000 people and to possess around 47,000 number of weapons, 
making an annual income of about 180 million Euros, of which only 
a fraction is subjected to the system of taxes.19 This statistics is even 
                                                             
18  Blic online, 10.12.2012. Entering the Russian military alliance a poke in the face for the EU 
 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/357239/Ulazak-u-ruski-vojni-savez-prst-u-oko-EU 
19 Blic online, 9.1.2012. private security sector possesses 47,000 number of weapons  
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/300451/U-sektoru-privatnog-obezbedjenja-47000-komada-oruzja  
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more shocking when it is considered that the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs officially employs 35,000 policemen, while the Army of 
Serbia employs 28,000 military persons.    
 
2013 – THE YEAR OF RAISING EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN 
SERBIA 
 
In November 2012 members of the emergency response units in 
four municipalities in northern Kosovo held a demonstrational 
exercise of rescuing people in emergency situations in the northern 
part of Kosovska Mitrovica. The exercise was organized by the 
Serbian Government’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija, with the 
Mayor of Kosovska Mitrovica, Krstimir Pantić, who is also 
Commander of the Emergency Response in the Emergency 
Situations headquarters, stating on that occasion: “emergency 
response is established in accordance with the Geneva Convention”. 
Article 61 of this Convention specifically defines the purposes in 
which emergency response can be used, whilst Article 65 even 
allows the possibility for members of the emergency response to 
carry small arms for maintaining order or for self-defense. This 
peaceful organization is to be available to all citizens, regardless of 
the religious affiliation20. 
CEAS considers it rather interesting that the course of the 
mentioned exercise was followed by members of the Kosovo police, 
but also by some members of KFOR.  
In early January the Head of the Emergency Situation Sector of the 
Ministry of Interior Predrag Marić announced that after 25 years, 
the year 2013 will be the year of raising emergency response in 
                                                             
20 Blic online, 18.11.2012. Emergency Response exercise held in Mitrovica 
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/353660/Odrzana-vezba-Civilne-zastite-u-Mitrovici  
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Serbia. Marić expressed his satisfaction with the 10 million Dinar 
budget, allocated for the organization in 2013, which will allow the 
purchase of new fire engines and the stars of raising emergency 
response in Serbia21. 
Only a few days later, a serious incident took place during 
Aleksandar Vulin’s visit to Gračanica22. The Kosovo police told him 
they must escort him from Kosovo, because Vulin, according to the 
Tanjug news agency, wanted to visit a police station in Gračanica, 
where a number of Serbs were detained. The Kosovo Minister of 
Interior, Bajram Rexhepi, stated on that occasion that the reason for 
the arrest of nine people was that these persons reportedly wore 
marks of Emergency Response. Those arrested, who were said to 
have accompanied the Kosovo and Metohija Office Director, 
Aleksandar Vulin, were held at the police station for questioning, 
where some of them suffered violence by members of the Kosovo 
police. Reasonable noise was raised in the Serbian media around the 
mentioned violence, but after that it was never reported whether 
the Kosovo offenders were punished.  
Commander of the Emergency Response headquarters in Kosovska 
Mitrovica, Krstimir Pantić, sharply reacted in February 2013, to 
allegations put forward by KFOR Commander Volker Halbauer, on 
the legitimacy, legal status, activities and carrying weapons of 
Emergency Response units, and his threats that KFOR will react 
decisively in case members of the Emergency Response become a 
threat to the freedom of movement, safe and peaceful environment.  
“The legitimacy of this organization is undeniable and no one, 
including international security forces, can, or has the right to, 
challenge the legitimacy and legal status or restrict the work of the 
mentioned organization. It is possible to provide the functioning of 
                                                             
21 RTV, 3.1.2013. Emergency response again after 25 years  
http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/posle-25-godina-ponovo-civilna-zastita_361923.html 
22 Telegraf, 7.1.2013. SCANDAL IN KOSOVO: Detention for 9 Serbs from Aleksandar Vulin’s escort? 
http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/484157-skandal-na-kosovu-uhapseno-9-srba-iz-pratnje-aleksandra-vulina 
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Emergency Response even in occupied territories, and the 
occupying forces must ensure operations of members of the 
mentioned organization, in order to provide timely support and 
assistance to the local population. (…) The Čović-Haekkerup 
Agreement envisages the possibility of establishment and 
functioning of Emergency Response in Kosovo and Metohija, and 
that members of Emergency Response units are no threat to anyone, 
as their action is provided for when the property and security of the 
local population is compromised, in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention, and regardless of their ethnicity, or religion. We expect, 
and look forward to, cooperation with international security forces 
as we share a common goal, which is the erection of a peaceful and 
safe environment for all people in Kosovo and Metohija. (…) 
Unfortunately, KFOR was not successful in its missions so far, and 
members of the Emergency Response will be pleased to assist and 
support the members of KFOR, in order to prevent ethnic cleansing 
of Serbs and other non-Albanians taking place ever again. (…) Based 
on UN SC Resolution 1244 only international forces are entitled to 
bear arms, and expect from the KFOR Commander to, accordingly, 
disband and disarm members of the so-called Kosovo security 
forces, which are an open threat to peace and security in the 
province. (…) The Emergency Response units will demonstrate the 
capabilities, skills, qualifications and firm intention of the 
organization to serve the citizens and to protect them. (…) I call 
upon the KFOR Commander to, after more than six months as he 
took office, visit the local self-government in the north of the 
province and attend the exercises of Emergency Response members, 
in order to be personally persuaded that they do not pose as a threat 
to anyone”23.   
                                                             
23 Telegraf, 01.02.2013. Pantid: KFOR cannot dispute the legitimacy of the Emergency Response 
http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/525015-pantic-kfor-ne-moze-da-ospori-legitimitet-civilne-zastite 
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CEAS reiterates that according to the existing Law on Emergency 
Situations, Emergency Response members do not have the right to 
bear arms24.  
In late March 2013, Bratislav Rančić, Head of the Emergency 
Response in the Department for Emergency Situations of the 
Serbian Ministry of Interior, announced that the first training of 
specialized emergency response units is to commence in mid-May 
and that calls for this will be forwarded through the Ministry of 
Defense. This will, it is believed, practically begin the process of 
restoring this service in Serbia25. 
In an interview for the daily newspapers Politika, Bratislav Rančić 
highlights that “Those who served military service without firearms, 
that is, as ‘civil service’, as it was popularly referred to at the time, 
will be called for training first. During their military service they 
already had adequate training and were classified in reserves of 
Emergency Response. I do not want to be misunderstood; this is no 
mobilization or military exercise, but training for humanitarian 
tasks in case of need. This service, which was under the Ministry of 
Defense’s jurisdiction until a few years ago, was transferred into the 
jurisdiction of Serbia’s Ministry of Interior during the great reform 
of the system for emergency situations. 
Now, the time has come for the training of emergency response 
units, which could, if necessary, be employed as additional support 
to professional firefight-rescue units. We are now training 
specialized emergency response units. The training of 1.400 
members of emergency response is planned for this year, and at the 
end of this process, specialized emergency response units should 
amount to more than 11.000 members across Serbia. There exist 
units of emergency response for general purpose, but the 
                                                             
24 Law on Emergency Situations of the Republic of Serbia 
http://www.mup.gov.rs/cms/resursi.nsf/Zakon%20o%20vanrednim%20situacijama-lat.pdf 
25 Politika, 27.3.2013. Emergency Response reservists training begins 
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Pocinje-obuka-rezervista-civilne-zastite.lt.html  
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organization of these is within the jurisdiction of local self-
governments. A Rulebook on uniform and rank marks, specialties 
and identity cards of members of Emergency Response was adopted 
recently. After many years, Emergency Response will be 
recognizable by modern uniforms. 
At the start of the year, a Rulebook on training, curricula, programs 
and standards of teaching and teaching aids for the training of 
Emergency Response members has been adopted, creating the 
preconditions for the start of the training. 
The first to be trained will be the specialized units for fire protection 
in Kruševac and Valjevo. Emergency Response reservists from these 
cities will pass a five-day training, in the period of May 13-17, and 
then trainings will take place across Serbia, two units every week. 
When it comes to specialized emergency response units units, the 
training of 27 units for fire protection is planned, that is, training in 
all regional Directorates of the Sector for Emergency Situations of 
the Ministry of Interior. Nine units for rescue from ruins will be 
trained as well, in Užice, Šabac, Kikinda, Zaječar, Vranje, Novi Pazar, 
Pirot, Valjevo and Sremska Mitrovica. Belgrade and Sombor will 
have units for rescue on water, whilst Čačak and Prokuplje will have 
units for will have first aid units. Training of units for rescue in 
unhospitable terrain is envisioned as well, in Valjevo, whilst units 
for radiological-chamical-biological protection are to be placed in 
Kruševac. 
Establishment of an active Emergency Response force in planned. 
Around 500 people will be engaged in these units. This would be a 
contract-based comitment. Members of these units should receive a 
permanent monthly salary, with an obligation to respond to calls for 
engagement across of Serbia if necessary. The best members of 
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specialized units will be enrolled in these units, whose training will 
start, naturally, in case they want it“26. 
On the other side, according to information available to CEAS, there 
are around 500 members of the Emergency Response units 
operating in northern Kosovo, controlled by a Serbian Government 
official, Krstimir Pantić.  
Section 3.1 in Annex III of the Ahtisaari Plan, which defines the 
jurisdiction of municipalities mentions in point g. “local emergency 
response”, which CEAS sees as most likely relating to the functions 
of emergency response units. 
CEAS believes that already now would be a good time to pay 
attention to the existence of parasecurity   units of the Serbian 
Government in Kosovo, which have a command structure, logistics, 
goals and else. If these are not covered by the talks, with all doubts 
about them removed in time, there is a serious threat of one party 
saying “that means they must be transformed” and the other “that 
means that during negotiations no one had any objections and 
therefore they stay”, at a later date. 
 
  
                                                             
26 Politika, 27.3.2013Emergency Response reservists training begins 
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Pocinje-obuka-rezervista-civilne-zastite.lt.html  
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TENDENCIES IN MEDIA REPORTING ON THE SITUATION IN 
NORTHERN KOSOVO 
 
The media in Serbia which are under majority influence of the ruling 
authorities report on the security situation in northern Kosovo and 
Kosovo as a whole in a very problematic way.  
Although CEAS sources claim that most incidents in northern 
Kosovo, numbering over 30 in the past two months alone, are not 
ethnically motivated, are a consequence of intimidation of Serbs and 
others, primarily the staff working in the Government of Kosovo 
Office in Northern Mitrovica, by other Serbs or are impossible to 
trace (throwing a stone so that no-one has seen the perpetrator), the 
Serbian media report on them as ethnically motivated attacks 
committed by Kosovo Albanians. Even when investigations 
unquestionably prove otherwise, Serbian media almost as a rule 
omit to report those corrections.  
Moreover, media in Serbia neglect to report on the very dangerous 
tendency that growing number of incidents in Northern Mitrovica 
are caused not by Molotov cocktails which are relatively easy to 
acquire on one’s own, but by bombs and shells as well as plastic 
explosives. CEAS sources especially point out the tendency to 
remove designations from explosive devices used in the incidents, 
which suggest a work by professionals rather than a spontaneous 
rebellion by citizens of the North, as often reported in Serbia.  
The so-called self-organized groups of young rebels from Northern 
Mitrovica, mobilized through Facebook groups, mutually 
communicate with satellite phones, just like “spontaneously 
organized homophobes” who attacked the participants of the Pride 
Parade in Belgrade in 2011. And similarly, these perpetrators of 
violence possess unusually precise information about the position 
and movement of their targets.  
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CEAS has also noticed a tendency to evade in main newscasts and 
main media reports on decisions made by leaders of four 
municipalities in northern Kosovo as well as assemblies of these 
municipalities. This suggests that the Government of Serbia either 
does not want or is not capable of influencing the events in northern 
Kosovo, which was one of the main expectations by the Western 
international community that it would be able to do so.  
During the writing of this analysis (1 April 2013), border 
crossing Jarinje was blocked by vehicles. The blockade was 
organized by the leaders from the North who receive their 
salary from the budget of the Republic of Serbia!  
CEAS reiterates that burning and blockade of border crossings in 
summer 2011 was logistically enabled by trucks and men employed 
in public enterprises of the Government of Serbia and that people on 
the barricades stood under an obligation to show up there, the 
obligation which the municipalities imposed on them.27  
In statements of officials, Serbs south of the river Ibar, especially 
those who have integrated into Kosovo institutions, are still 
mentioned as a necessity, as when winners of beauty contests 
declare their commitment to world peace. The successes of their 
local communities are practically never reported in Serbian media 
or the fact that the number of incidents in this part of Kosovo, 
inhabited by Serbs, is far less than the one in northern Kosovo. 
There is a possibility that this difference is a result of activities of 
institutions, however, this would raise the question of activities of 
institutions of Serbia in northern Kosovo, and therefore it is not 
reported on. 
                                                             
27 CEAS Public Statement, 29.11.2011. Regarding the Situation in Northern Kosovo – Lifting the Working Obligation 
is a Moral Obligation of Serbia as a State 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/saopstenja/120-povodom-situacije-na-severu-kosova-ukidanje-radne-
obaveze-je-moralna-obaveza-drzave-srbije  
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The fact that Kosovo has become a full member of the Regional 
Cooperation Council28 has hardly been noticed by anyone in Serbia.  
The fourteenth anniversary of NATO bombing of Serbia was used as 
an occasion for another falsification of the past. No mainstream 
media in Serbia dared to mention crimes against Kosovo Albanians 
which preceded the NATO intervention or crimes of the Serbian 
forces in Kosovo during the NATO intervention even though, for 
example, it was precisely the time when the Humanitarian Law Fund 
published a very moving Dossier on the 549th motorized brigade of 
the Army of Yugoslavia and its crimes at the territory of 
municipalities of Prizren, Đakovica, Orahovac and Suva Reka from 
March 24, to June 10, 1999 under the command of General Božidar 
Delić who was an official of the Serbian Progress Party but later 
renewed his membership in the Serbian Radical Party.29  
 
  
                                                             
28
 e-Novine, 28.2.2013. Kosovo Full Member of the Regional Cooperation Council  
http://www.e-novine.com/region/region-kosovo/79884-Kosovo-punopravni-uesnik-Regionalnog-saveta-
saradnju.html  
29 Humanitarian Law Fund (2013) Dossier: The 549th Motorized Brigade of the Army of Yugoslavia 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/images/FHP_-_Dosije_549_motorizovana_brigada_Vojske__Jugoslavije.pdf  
25 
 
    
 
PROBLEMATIC STATEMENTS BY REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
OFFICIALS  
 
The situation in which the Serbian “leadership” finds itself is by no 
means enviable, which may somewhat serve as an excuse for 
muddled, cryptic messages by officials about the conducting of 
“negotiations,” and other measures which serve to attenuate 
possible negative public reaction, primarily reaction by Serbs in 
northern Kosovo.  
Ivica Dačić, Prime Minister of Serbia, has recently said: "Our friends 
are too far away to make plans with them about entering other 
unions in conditions when Serbia is surrounded by the EU and 
NATO and when there is no friend in that part of the world. We want 
an agreement and a compromise, but to achieve that there has to be 
at least a minimum if not a maximum of fairness for all sides.”30 
The utterly inappropriate comparison by Marko Djurić, foreign 
policy advisor of the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić, of the 
current situation with those before the Rambouillet talks and 
Dayton speaks either of the elementary ignorance of recent past or 
serves for unnecessary and dangerous intimidation of the Serbian 
public, or serves as justification for other reasons for which an 
agreement with Prishtina might fail due to an irrational Serbian 
attitude.  
CEAS reminds that in 2013 in the Western Balkans region there are 
no armed conflicts, there are no accusations of excessive use of force 
by units of the security system, and that therefore, in comparison to 
the nineties, there is a much stronger presence of international 
military and police forces with consensus of the states-territories in 
which they are located. 
                                                             
30 Blic online, 24.3.2013. Dačid: Our Friends Are Too Far Away to Make Plans with Them about a Union  
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/373716/Dacic-Nasi-prijatelji-su-daleko-da-bismo-sa-njima-pravili-planove-o-uniji  
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The greatest victim of such statements is public support for 
continuation of European integration of Serbia. Although aware of 
the decline of support to a record low of 41%31,   government 
representatives do not refrain from criticizing European values. The 
EU should think whether such officials, regardless of the 
complicated situation, truly have an intention to lead Serbia towards 
the EU and whether, in the end, they will have the public support to 
do so. Therefore the so-called efforts and readiness to reach a 
compromise with Prishtina, allegedly due to the significance which 
obtaining the date for the start of negotiations with the EU is 
supposed to have, should be taken with a grain of salt.  
CEAS maintains that only in the past month, Serbian officials have 
given a series of absolutely unacceptable statements or statements 
which bring into question their commitment to normalization of 
relations with Prishtina. Foreign officials, who monitor the process, 
as well as diplomats accredited in Serbia, are prone to excessively 
praise any media-savvy gesture (taking a photograph together, 
shaking hands…) but at the same time refrain from condemning 
those who fail to abate public tensions or contribute to true 
normalization of relations.  
We believe that the following statements should have been 
confronted with convictions from both the domestic and foreign 
international public. Otherwise, if we bury our head in the sand for 
everything and ascribe everything to the need to keep stability at 
the internal level and obtain support for the work of government 
officials, rather than a sustainable agreement with Prishtina, we will 
build a house of cards.  
 
                                                             
31 Danas, 28.1.2013. Support for Serbian EU accession at a record low  
http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/nikada_manja_podrska_ulasku_srbije_u_eu.56.html?news_id=254980 
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Aleksandar Vulin32, the Government Office for Kosovo and 
Metohija Director, founder of the Movement of Socialists, which in 
2010 entered a coalition with the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), 
New Serbia and the “Power of Serbia” movement, on occasion of the 
handshake shared by the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić and 
Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci at the Vatican, stated that “it is 
better that Tomislav Nikolić, Aleksandar Vučić, Ivica Dačić, 
Aleksandar Vulin be humiliated, than the people which they lead. 
When placed on the same stand with a man who represents a state 
which we believe does not exist, and a man around whom the 
investigation into the yellow house and organ trafficking is focused, 
and we are, here and now, asking at the Security Council to expedite 
the investigation and finally find something out, only to be on the 
same stand – yes, it is a disgrace. But it is better that Tomislav 
Nikolić and Vučić and Dačić and Vulin and all the Vulins of this world 
to suffer this humiliation, than for the people which they represent 
to suffer from it, at this historical moment. So yes, yes it is, that’s 
right”33. 
Mirko Krilić, the Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija 
Assistant Director, SNS staff, stated on the occasion of signing of 
the Charter on the recent twinning of 19 municipalities and cities 
from Republic of Srpska and 25 municipalities from Kosovo and 
Metohija, in an initiative organized by the Government Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija that “With this twinning with RS 
municipalities, as well as earlier municipalities in central Serbia, an 
unstoppable process of addition of Serbs is being conducted”. 
                                                             
32 Istinomer, Aleksandar Vulin’s Biography 
 http://istinomer.rs/akter/aleksandar-vulin/ 
Glas javnosti, 8.8.2000. Aleksandar Vulin’s Biography 
http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/08/09/srpski/P00080817.shtm 
33 B92, 24.2.2013. Vulin: We do not want Ahtisaari’s Plan 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=03&dd=24&nav_category=11&nav_id=698279 
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“This Serbian addition of ours…because we are vulnerable, to give 
hope and to stop fear. We add ourselves because Kosovo is Serbia, 
because Kosovo is Serbian.34” 
CEAS remark: Twinning is a common practice, but for ethnically 
diverse municipalities, within the borders of one state or regionally. 
Krstimir Pantić35, allegedly still SNS staff, Government Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija Deputy Director 
“If pressures on the Government and the Serbs in Kosovo continue, 
developments that will not benefit anyone, neither the Serbian 
Government, nor the international community, is possible. 
Following the declaration of the northern Kosovo and Metohija 
Assembly, the four municipal councilors would probably ask the 
Hague International Tribunal the same question, as in the case of the 
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo by the Albanians, 
and that is – whether an informal group of people has the right to 
declare their own Assembly and autonomy on part of the territory. I 
do not see how the International Court of Justice at The Hague could 
reach a different decision to that when Prishtina was at stake"36.  
CEAS remark: Mayors and local self-government officials in the 
aforementioned four municipalities in northern Kosovo are financed 
by the Government of Serbia!  
                                                             
34
 Blic online, 22.3.2013. Twinning of municipalities in Kosovo and and Metohija and Republic of Srpska 
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/373585/Bratimljenje-opstina-Kosova-i-Metohije-i-Republike-Srpske  
35 Former President of the Assembly of Municipalities (northern) Kosovska Mitrovica, elected in October 2010, 
replacing the local government in power until then, made up of representatives of the „democratic bloc“ 
Novi Magazin, 25.10.2011. Who are the leaders of the Serbs? 
http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/ko-su-lideri-srba 
36 RTS, 31.3.2013. Pantid: Possible address to the court at the Hague?! 
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1295664/Panti%C4%87%3A+Mogu%C4%87e+obra%C4%87anje
+sudu+u+Hagu.html?email=yes 
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Jadranka Joksimović37, Serbian Progress Party, the president of 
the parliamentary committee for the oversight over 
intelligence services   
The president of the parliamentary committee for the control of 
security services Jadranka Joksimović said that she did not believe 
that in the case of an agreement in the dialogue between Belgrade 
and Prishtina was not reached; the security situation would 
deteriorate, but that she could not say that it was impossible… “Our 
security services regularly monitor the situation in the field, are 
ready to react in the case of hopefully inexistent bad scenario. The 
security services are in a state of readiness, but I expect that 
negotiations should prevent conflicts and that in this regard, the 
international community would insist that the argument of violence 
was not used” Joksimović concluded.38   
CEAS remark: If this refers to possible violence in northern Kosovo, 
Serbia which cites UNSC Resolution 1244 under the same Resolution 
does not have the right to deploy members of security forces in 
Kosovo. Interestingly, Joksimović does not entertain the possibility 
of riots in the case the agreement is reached.  
 
  
                                                             
37
 Member of the Central Committee of the Serbian Progressive Party, president of the Committee for the control 
of the security services, former member of the Serbian Radical Party 
38 Blic online, 31.3.2013. Joksimovid: Serbian Security Services Prepared to Reach in the Case of Violence in Kosovo  
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/374964/Joksimovic-Srpske-sluzbe-bezbednosti-spremne-da-reaguju-u-slucaju-
nasilja-na-Kosovu  
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THE ALLEGED FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
Simultaneously with the alleged search for sustainable solution to 
relations with Prishtina, an alleged fight against corruption is 
carried out in Serbia as well39. When the Government led by late 
Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić identified organized crime and its 
collusion with the state as a huge stumbling block to further 
democratization of Serbia, its first move was to literally and legally 
build institutions required for the systematic fight against it. This, 
presently, is not the case at all.  
In 2012 Serbia launched the allegedly decisive fight against 
corruption under the leadership of the Defense Minister, who 
coordinates the work of task forces made up of members of the 
Interior Ministry – which is telling in its own right – at the moment 
when there was a general consensus that reform of the judiciary has 
not been carried properly. CEAS reiterates that the alleged fight 
against corruption was launched in circumstances in which the 
security system remains full of faults, the existence of which, 
unfortunately, no-one even tries to deny, although they have been 
ignored for such a long time.   
The notorious criminal offense “the abuse of official position,”40 a 
remnant of totalitarian system which serves for squaring accounts 
with political opponents and economic competition along the lines 
“you are guilty but we just have yet to see what to charge you with” 
is still in effect, although some cosmetic changes were introduced, 
deemed to serve as sufficient for the EU at the present stage.  
According to information available to CEAS, the EU has never said 
that all 24 privatizations have indeed been illegally carried out, 
                                                             
39 In Serbia, the phrase „fight against corruption“ usually refers to the fight against other forms of financial 
machinations and crime as well 
40 The Law Amending the Criminal Code  
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/zakoni/2012/4108-12.pdf  
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although re-examination is expected for various reasons and often 
because of the complaints to the European Commission and other 
EU institutions and member states lodged by private companies that 
had been included in rather non-transparent and legally 
superficially regulated process especially in the period of sanctions 
enforced upon Serbia during the Milošević regime, - truly criminally 
carried out. However, precisely this impression is created in the 
Serbian public through statements by public officials, primarily 
Aleksandar Vučić, who completely unfoundedly became the symbol 
of the fight against corruption, and media controlled by the new 
authorities. It is supposedly only a matter of time when the turn will 
come for each of them to be investigated. Accidentally, the turn for 
privatizations in which SNS’ coalition partner in the present 
government - the Socialist Party of Serbia was included – has not yet 
come.  
At the same time, the “hero” of the fight against corruption, as he is 
described by most the Western international community officials, 
Aleksandar Vučić, has failed to utter a single word about systemic 
sources of corruption in the security system, from intolerably high 
non-transparency of the public procurement process to numerous 
other things. The Government he is effectively heading has not 
adopted laws that would amend the management of public 
enterprises which are a huge source of corruption in an adequate 
way. Serbia is still the only country in the region which does not 
have the final budgetary audit41. 
The reports by the State Audit Institution about the scope of 
identified breaches of procedure in the work of public enterprises 
and the legally envisaged penal measures, the amending of which 
no-one has officially announced, are in gross contradiction.  
                                                             
41 B92, 9.12.2011. The Government hides the final bill again 
http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2011&mm=12&dd=09&nav_id=564316 
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If the fight against corruption launched by this Government had 
been sincere even to the slightest degree, as well as its desire to 
normalize relations with Prishtina and fulfill the obligation towards 
the EU to enable unhindered work of EULEX to establish the rule of 
law in the entire territory of Kosovo, the Government of Serbia 
would, for a start, close the Agency for Business Registers in 
northern Kosovo, which was opened during the term in office of the 
Government led by Vojislav Koštunica. The work of companies the 
setting up of which requires nothing but the stamp of this 
Government of Serbia Agency, unlike the work of other economic 
subjects at the territory of Serbia proper, is not possible to fully 
control. This enables existence of a large number of phantom 
companies or companies which are bankrupt, but which purchase 
tax-free merchandize on the administrative crossing between 
Kosovo and Serbia. The real owners of merchandize are thus able to 
sell their goods in both Kosovo and Serbia at the price free from 
taxes. It is estimated that damage to the Serbian budget which 
results from this equals at least 30-50 million Euros, through 
various tax evasions.   
The Agreement on Integrated Border Management, whose 
implementation the four municipalities in northern Kosovo are very 
intensely opposed to, could allow much greater exchange of 
information on goods crossing between Kosovo and Serbia. If this 
happens, the space for manipulation of Serbian and Kosovo tax 
systems will be significantly narrowed. 
The Serbian Government, allegedly in the midst of the fights against 
corruption, takes no visible steps to shut down the so-called 
“alternative routes” between Serbia and Kosovo, although such 
practice is in direct conflict with the regulations that same 
Government adopted42, which define the places where crossing the 
                                                             
42 Administrative border crossing is allowed only at three crossings in the area of the so-called northern Kosovo, 
and these are Jarinje, Vučja Lokva/Odojevid and Tabalije 
http://www.glassrbije.org/%C4%8Dlanak/uredba-vlade-srbije-o-kontroli-prelaska-administrativne-linije  
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line is allowed. Crossing the line outside of the prescribed places is 
allowed “only with the competent authority’s permission” and in 
case of force majeure. Non-application of the regulation made 
controls of what and who really crosses that line become almost 
impossible. This raises the question whether the “competent 
authority” issued such an approval after all. 
 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR OF THE WESTERN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND X FACTOR RUSSIA 
 
CEAS understands the current need of the Western international 
community to formalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia in a 
way which will enable both sides to have a European future. On the 
other hand, CEAS maintains that for normalization of relations 
between Kosovo and Serbia, and primarily for sustainable 
agreement between the two sides, it is necessary to adopt much 
more comprehensive and different approach from the present one 
which does not guarantee sustainability and largely takes its toll in 
deterioration of previously achieved democratic procedures and 
practices in Serbia.  
CEAS expresses disappointment and concern about the fact that 
arguments about the significance of reaching of an agreement 
between Belgrade and Prishtina, furnished by the Western 
international community due to change of geopolitical tendencies 
and disagreements within the EU itself, have completely abandoned 
initial interpretation of the nature of conflict in Kosovo in 1998-
1999 and the scope of crimes committed by the Serbian security 
forces before NATO intervention, the reasons for NATO intervention 
as well as the fact that UNSC Resolution 1244 has a limited expiry 
date.  
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Instead, the pressure was made on Serbia to take part in “the 
dialogue” in which it has to make 99% of concessions. This causes 
confusion in the Serbian public, primarily among the young, to 
whom the war criminals are the main role models, along with 
footballers and show business starlets43, contributing to the fall of 
support to European integration of Serbia.    
Confusion is caused, and CEAS estimates that the consequences of 
this confusion are yet to have a negative impact on Serbia, by some 
senior officials from the Western international community 
exaggerating the achievements of the ongoing alleged fight against 
corruption in Serbia, in an attempt to, probably, contribute to the 
internal strengthening of the oppositions position in which they 
have placed unfoundedly great hopes that it will sincerely 
contribute to the normalization of relations with Kosovo, and 
therefore that there is institutional and political strength for this. 
The Western international community completely neglects, in its 
celebration of the efforts of current Serbian officials in normalizing 
relations with Prishtina, mostly just rhetorical, not only their past 
and relationship with the Serbian and regional recent past, but also 
the fact that they were the greatest opposition to any kind of 
progress in relations with Prishtina during the last Government’s 
mandate. The real reasons for their official change of rhetoric on the 
need for normalization of relations with Kosovo are still not very 
clear. CEAS doubts in their sincerity as well. This sudden change, 
which is inconsistent with the pre-election rhetoric of SNS and SPS, 
can likely contribute to resistance to a possible sustainable solution 
for the normalization of relations with Kosovo rising within both 
parties. 
When it comes to SNS, instead of deeper ideological divisions within 
the party, which is still formed by switching a large number of 
                                                             
43 B92, 25.3.2013. Graduates like Legija and Karleuša 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=03&dd=25&nav_category=206&nav_id=698578 
35 
 
    
 
members of the Serbian Radical Party, people ideologically and 
commercially close to Russia, which is the case with the SNS 
coalition partner, party of the fugitive tycoon Bogoljub Karić, the 
Western circles and media primarily insist on the potential conflict 
and differences between the former and current Party President 
Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić. According to CEAS sources, 
the issue of who Krstimir Pantić, whom SNS apparently fruitlessly, if 
this was even done sincerely, attempted to remove from activities in 
northern Kosovo, is currently loyal to remains open. 
The balance of powers, commercial interest conflicts, increased 
allegations of involvement in corruption affairs and criminal 
privatization, followed by unclear relations of some high state 
officials such as Dušan Bajatović and Parliamentary Committee on 
Defense and Security President, who is at the same time head of 
Srbijagas, and Supervisory Board Member of Jugorosgaz, which deal 
with Russia, gives reasons for seeing the situations in SPS unstable. 
Recently, tensions between coalition partners over treatment to the 
Serbian obligations related to the realization of the South Stream 
project are apparent, escalating after accusations put forward by 
Aleksey Miller, Director of the Russian energy giant Gazprom44. 
Miller allegedly stated, during recent talks at the Serbian 
Government headquarters, that “individuals are trying to obstructs” 
the gas deal between Russia and Serbia and the building of the 
“South Stream”, to which the First Deputy Prime Minister 
Aleksandar Vučić replied that such individuals will be thrown out of 
the Government and the SNS.  
Both parties are in different ways associated with Russia, whose 
officials in the past gave a string of statements, not always 
consistent and diplomatic, on the negotiations with Prishtina and 
Serbian European integration. Recently, a trend of more intensive 
                                                             
44 Novi Magazin, 31.3.2013. Who is obstructing the South Stream? 
http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/ko-opstruise-juzni-tok  
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suggestions coming from Russian officials that the negotiations 
between Belgrade and Prishtina should be returned under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN) has been spotted45. It should 
not be forgotten that part of the personnel in the Serbian 
Government belongs to the “Russian School”. Even those retired 
from that generation are still very active through the work in think 
tanks and other organizations with which the MoD closely 
cooperates, which is not the case when it comes to cooperation with 
civil society organizations that do not have that background. 
Generally, X Factor Russia, from the role of the so-called 
international humanitarian center in Niš, and further on, followed 
by the level of its influence on political events in Serbia, is not even 
nearly systematically and analytically processed to the extent CEAS 
sees necessary, as well as in order to sustain the agreement in 
Prishtina if it occurs.  
It appears that in spite of everything mentioned, which are well 
known facts, the Western international community still places 
unreasonably high hopes that the current representatives of Serbian 
authorities will be able to and/or have the political will to, if an 
agreement with Prishtina is formally reached, starts implementing it 
in practice. 
Also, except for light warnings of EU technocrats that there is still 
more to do regarding the integration of Roma and fight against 
discrimination, the fact that the trend which separates Serbs, 
arbitrarily, into patriots and traitors, promoted by ideologues of 
blood and soil, is becoming legitimized again is being neglected. This 
is not initiated only in the extremist margins, which are by the way 
louder and freer in spreading hate speech and threats to various 
social groups in favor of Serbia turning towards the political West, 
                                                             
45 Press, 2.4.2013. Čepurin: The question of Kosovo should be solved through UN structures, not through the EU 
and USA 
http://pressonline.rs/info/politika/267895/cepurin-pitanje-kosova-treba-resavati-preko-struktura-un-a-ne-preko-
eu-i-sad.html 
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using social networking and their official media. The trend is, 
unfortunately, legitimized through mainstream media, which are, 
one way or another, controlled by the current Government. In them, 
legitimate interlocutors on current events are increasingly 
promoters of ideas such as Dragomir Andjelković, columnist for the 
Pečat weekly, whose articles are regularly promoted by the Pravda 
online portal, media close to at least one fraction of the SNS. After 
the establishment of the new Government, Anđelković supported 
drafting of lists of unsuitable people, initiated by a Ministry of 
Culture official, criticizing his incompleteness adding that “the anti-
Serbian cultural-NGO-media fifth column is more dangerous than 
any natural elements and that it high time to put an end to it”. 
If forced to accept some sort of an agreement, Serbian leaders will 
still be able, through the media they control and the finances they 
possess, to protect themselves from destructive influences of anti-
Western extremists groups which are increasingly agile. 
Unfortunately, more honest pro-EU options, such as the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and parts of the civil sector which still 
believe in transitional justice, will not be able to do the same. A 
question is posed whether it makes sense to grant the date for the 
start of entry negotiations to a country which, for the sake of 
obtaining that date, has become fully Putinized! 
The process of facing the recent war-criminal past has completely 
died down in Serbia, with tacit agreement of the Western 
international community and we are afraid that it will remain even 
so if the present incumbents come to “an agreement” with Prishtina. 
As we have already pointed out, the Humanitarian Law Fund has 
warned about an increasing tendency in Serbia to reduce the 
number of war crime trials before domestic courts. Unfortunately, 
the number of crimes committed by the security forces of Serbia and 
its state-legal predecessors is hugely disproportionate to the 
number of final judgments for those crimes. The remaining suspects 
are here among us, in the police, the Army, private security 
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companies, intelligence and security services, queuing for a bus… 
Some of them will perhaps be integrated into the Kosovo police if 
pressures are exerted to reach an agreement although detailed 
implementation plans and reasonable implementation deadlines are 
not in place. Some of them, within institutions or individually, might 
violently oppose the possible agreement. Some have perhaps been 
intimidating and blackmailing Serbs from Kosovo for years, 
primarily those in the north, not to integrate into Kosovo 
institutions.  
Unfortunately, increasingly frequent and well-grounded unbiased 
complaints are made about politicization of the work of the Serbian 
War Crimes Prosecution. The case of brothers Bitici and recent 
decision by the Appellate Court confirming the judgment to clear 
policemen Sreten Popović and Miloš Stojanović from allegations to 
have assisted the murder of US citizens brothers Bitici in Petrovo 
Selo in 1999 is an illustrative example of the Prosecution’s bad work 
as well as of the selectivity and double standards of both the Serbian 
and the US side.46  
Unlike the President of Kosovo who has appointed her legal advisor 
as a personal envoy to regional expert group RECOM,47 the initiative 
for RECOM has completely died down in Serbia. Oliver Antić, advisor 
to the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić, who is an avowed critic of 
the very concept and existence of The Hague Tribunal, according to 
the information available to CEAS, is in charge of shaping the 
position of Serbia on April 10, 2013 during the discussion on the 
work of UN ad hoc courts scheduled by UN General Assembly 
President Vuk Jeremić. The President of Serbia, Tomislav NIkolić, 
also gave unacceptable statements about the genocide in Serbia48. 
                                                             
46 e-Novine, 28.3.2013. The State Hides Killers of Americans  
http://www.e-novine.com/mobile/srbija/srbija-tema/81579-Pravosue-krije-dravne-egzekutore.html  
47 Humanitarian Law Fund (2013) The President of Kosovo Appoints Personal Envoy for RECOM  
http://www.zarekom.org/vesti/Predsednica-Kosova-imenovala-licnog-izaslanika-za-REKOM.sr.html  
48 B92, 9.10.2012. Nikolid: There was no genocide  
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=10&dd=09&nav_category=11&nav_id=650009 
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CEAS reiterates that the mechanism of transitional justice, primarily 
the obligation to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal, has been the 
only legally available mechanism, in addition to retiring, for 
dismissing the staff in the security sector in a country which has 
opted for non-violent method of regime change, implying an 
agreement with parts of the deeply compromised and criminalized 
security system.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Vesti online, 8.6.2012. Nikolid: Srebrenica is a heavy crime, not genocide 
http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/230768/Nikolic-Srebrenica-tezak-zlocin-ne-genocid 
Danas, 4.6.2012. Brussels criticizes Nikolid  
http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/brisel_kritikuje_nikolica.56.html?news_id=241598 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
CEAS hopes that Belgrade and Prishtina will soon reach an 
agreement on a long term sustainable solution in relations which 
will accelerate the normalization of mutual relations and European 
integration of both sides. 
However, we believe that, based on all the above, there are serious 
obstacles for its eventual adoption and implementation in Serbia. 
Figuratively speaking, the competition for the X Factor – Serbia, is 
not over yet. The strength, desire and “that something special – the X 
Factor” to lead Serbia, for one reason or another, towards the 
political East or the political West have differently grouped, and not 
necessarily mutually ideologically linked fractions in the Serbian 
society but also the state institutions. 
CEAS expresses its concern that the Western international 
community, although aware of the majority of the mentioned 
problems and challenges which Serbia is faced with today or which 
it additionally creates, somewhat unwisely invested significant 
political credibility by demonstrating support to the current Serbian 
Government, hoping it has a genuine desire, political and 
institutional strength to accept and assist the implementation of 
sustainable agreement.  
The price for such great support for the Government, which is yet to 
fulfill the majority of expectations and given promises, is already too 
high for continuing the process of Serbian democratization. We fear 
that Serbia might, at best, obtain a date to start negotiations whilst 
at the same time seriously Putinized. This is a dead end from which 
both, the EU, which will still need at least Serbia’s role in 
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normalizing its relations with Kosovo, and Serbia, will find it hard to 
get out of. 
The imposition of political will be compromised leaders on both 
sides in order to reach such a solution, laundering of biographies 
which brings confusion into the entire region that has not yet 
substantially faced with all events which took place during the 
nineties armed conflicts, probable blackmail to discredit the 
democratic process as long as such people are supported and 
remain in power, giving up on the commitment for continuing the 
process of transitional justice for the sake of achieving short term 
solutions, cannot give a long term sustainable and positive result of 
stabilization and democratization of the region, in which the 
Western international community already invested a lot of time, 
large financial resources and political credibility.  
CEAS maintains that consistent implementation of transitional 
justice, and primarily war crimes trials before national courts and 
The Hague Tribunal, is exactly the best and sometimes the only 
mechanism for creating the essential conditions for reforms of the 
security system. It is exactly this system, unreformed and 
criminalized, which is often the main obstacle to stabilization and 
democratization in post-conflict countries.  
CEAS recommends that the Western international community: 
 
 Mentions its initial interpretation of the nature of the conflict 
in Kosovo in 98-99 more often, along with the scope of crimes 
committed by the Serbian security forces in Kosovo before and 
during the NATO intervention, the reasons for NATO’s 
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intervention and the fact that the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 has a limited, though not defined lifetime;  
 
 Intensifies its interest and support for continued 
implementation of transitional justice in the entire region of 
the Western Balkans; 
 
 
 Pays more attention to the state of the security system in 
Serbia and becomes more intensely involved in the support 
and realization of continued security system reform in Serbia, 
contributing to the enhancement of opportunities for achieving 
sustainable implementation and normalization of relations 
with Kosovo; 
 
 
 Acts more objectively in assessing the results of the current 
fight against corruption, thus highlighting the need for 
strengthening the institutions of the system and introducing 
legal measures which would better prevent cases of 
corruption, including those related to the north of Kosovo; 
 
 
 Acts with slightly less opportunism in public evaluations of 
events in Serbia today. The current dose introduces additional 
confusion into Serbian society, hard hit by the economic crisis 
and transition, and makes the work of the real democratic pro-
EU orientated powers harder; 
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 Pay attention to the existence of parasecurity   units of the 
Serbian Government in Kosovo (Emergency Response units), 
which have a command structure, logistics, goals and else. If 
these are not covered by the talks, with all doubts about them 
removed in time, there is a serious threat of one party saying 
“that means they must be transformed” and the other “that 
means that during negotiations no one had any objections and 
therefore they stay”, at a later date; 
 
 
 Tries to do everything from its side in order not to slow down 
the process of Serbian European integration, including 
supporting the Kosovo side to make certain legislative changes 
in order to achieve a sustainable agreement between Belgrade 
and Prishtina. This should be under the condition that 
Belgrade shows a clear commitment to disband the so-called 
parallel security and judicial structures in northern Kosovo as 
soon as possible, calls upon the Serbs in Kosovo to participate 
in all future elections in Kosovo which will be implemented 
according to Kosovo laws, and accepts all other obligations 
defined ahead with the purpose of carrying out a peaceful 
transition in the north of Kosovo. Slowing down of the process 
of Serbian European integration would lead to an additional 
decline in public support for it, and the strengthening of anti-
Western, undemocratic options in Serbia. It should not be 
forgotten that, one way or another, generations of Serbian 
citizens, members of civil society and political parties worked 
hard, often in very precarious conditions, for Serbia’s formal 
European path and its integration, and therefore confrontation 
with the recent past and erection of transitional justice in the 
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past twenty years. One gets the impression that in case of 
absence of an agreement, or its dysfunction in practice, due to 
the intention of the Western international community to put an 
end to the question of Kosovo’s status, in the absence of an 
adequate „Plan B“, exactly these groups will be the biggest 
losers. In this case, it is very likely that the winners of the X 
Factor Serbia competition will be performers who will carry 
out the Putinization of Serbia extremely well.  
 
  
45 
 
    
 
ABOUT THE CENTER FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES 
 
The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies – CEAS is an independent, 
atheist, socially oriented left liberal think-tank organization, 
founded in 2007 in Belgrade. With its high quality research work 
CEAS generates precise analysis in the field of foreign, security and 
defense policy of the Republic of Serbia. Simultaneously, CEAS 
publicly promotes innovative, applicable recommendations and 
creates practical policy whose aims are: 
 Strengthening of the socially oriented, left liberal democracy in 
Serbia* 
 Adopting the principle of precedence of individual over 
collective rights, without disregard for the rights which 
individuals can only achieve through collective action 
 Development of the of the concept of transitional justice and 
the establishment of mechanisms for its enforcement in the 
Western Balkans region, exchange of positive experiences, 
emphasizing the importance of mechanisms of transitional 
justice for a successful security sector reform in post-conflict 
societies in transition towards democracy; 
 Acceleration of the processes of Serbian EU integration and 
strengthening of its capacities for confronting global challenges 
through collective international action. 
 Strengthening cooperation with NATO and advocacy for 
Serbian Atlantic integration 
 Strengthening a secular state principle and promoting an 
atheistic understanding of the world, 
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 Contributing to the erection and preservation of a more open, 
safe, prosperous and cooperative international order, founded 
on the principles of smart globalization and equitable 
sustainable development and the international norm of 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
CEAS fulfills the mentioned activities through various projects 
assorted in four permanent programs: 
 Advocacy for Serbian Euro-Atlantic Integration 
 Security Sector Reform in Serbia 
 Transitional justice 
 Liberalism, Globalization, International Relations and Human 
Rights 
CEAS is an active member of the REKOM coalition which gathers 
more than 1,800 civil society organizations, individuals from all the 
countries stemming from the break-up of former SFRY. Among them 
are also missing persons’ parental and family societies, veterans, 
news reporters, representatives of minority ethnic communities, 
organizations for the protection of human rights, etc. The REKOM 
coalition suggests that governments (or states) establish REKOM, an 
independent, inter-state Regional Commission for the Establishment 
of Facts on all the victims of war crimes and other heavy human 
rights violations undertaken on the territory of the former SFRY in 
the period 1991-2001. 
During 2012 CEAS became an associate member of Policy 
Association for an Open Society – PASOS, the international 
association of expert non-governmental organizations (think-tanks) 
from Europe and Central Asia which supports the erection and 
functioning of an open society, especially in relation to issues of 
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political and economic transition, democratization and human 
rights, opening up of the economy and good public governance, 
sustainable development and international cooperation. PASOS now 
has 40 full and 10 associate members, amongst which is the 
prestigious European Council on Foreign Relations from London - 
ECFR, and, until now, only the Belgrade Center for Security Policy - 
BCBP, from the non-governmental sector in Serbia. 
During the same year, the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies became 
the first civil society organization from the region of South-Eastern 
Europe to join the International Coalition for the Responsibility to 
Protect – ICRtoP as a full member. The coalition brings together 
non-governmental organizations from all over the world to 
collectively strengthen normative consensus for the doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), with the aim of better 
understanding the norm, pushing for strengthened capacities of the 
international community to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and mobilize the non-
governmental sector to push for action to save lives in RtoP country-
specific situations. Among the prominent members of the Coalition 
are organization such as the Human Rights Watch - HRW and the 
International Crisis Group – ICG. 
*Social liberalism claims that society needs to protect freedoms and 
equal opportunities for all citizens and encourage mutual cooperation 
between government and market institutions through a liberal 
system. In the process of evolution, it agrees that some limitations 
placed upon economic affairs are needed, such as anti-monopoly laws 
in the fight against economic monopoly, regulatory bodies or 
legislation concerning minimum pay. Social liberals believe that 
governments can (or must) cater for the comfort, health protection 
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and education through revenue gained from taxes, so to enable the 
best use of the populations’ talent. Furthermore, liberal-socialism 
fights against extreme forms of capitalism and communism. It also 
vows for calmer anti-clericalism and religious freedom. 
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